City University of New York (CUNY)

CUNY Academic Works
Economics Working Papers

CUNY Academic Works

2015

Joan Robinson and MIT
Harvey Gram
CUNY Graduate Center

Geoffrey Harcourt
University of New South Wales

Follow this and additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_econ_wp
Part of the Economics Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_econ_wp/9
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY).
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu

CUNY GRADUATE CENTER PH.D PROGRAM IN ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER SERIES

Joan Robinson and MIT

Harvey Gram

Geoffrey Harcourt

Working Paper 9

Ph.D. Program in Economics
CUNY Graduate Center
365 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10016
October 2015

© 2015 by Harvey Gram and Geoffrey Harcourt. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided
that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source.

Joan Robinson and MIT
Harvey Gram and Geoffrey Harcourt
JEL No: A10, B30

ABSTRACT
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own question: how to get into equilibrium? If the notion of “vision at a distance,” inherent
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Joan Robinson and MIT
Harvey Gram1 and GC Harcourt2

In concluding “MIT and the Other Cambridge”, Roger Backhouse asserts, “The controversy
between the two Cambridges eventually came to be seen by MIT economists (and most of the
economics profession) as a waste of time” (Backhouse, 2014, p. 269; hereafter RB with page
numbers only).3 He begins, of course, with Joan Robinson’s famous attack on the use of the
aggregate production function in the theory of capital (Robinson, 1953-54). In an open
provocation, she asserted that “the production function has been a powerful instrument of miseducation … [resulting in] sloppy habits of thought [being] handed on from one generation to
the next” (ibid, p. 81). “This challenge was taken up by the MIT economists Robert Solow and
Paul Samuelson, who claimed that her objections were unfounded” (RB, 253). And so began
the two Cambridges capital controversy. More than a decade later, during which time Sraffa’s
famously short book (Sraffa, 1960) had also attracted great interest, “A Summing Up”
(Samuelson, 1966) “marked MIT’s recognition of Robinson’s technical point” (RB, p. 259),4
1
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He also offers a novel thesis, not considered here; namely, “a less-known but significant outcome of
the controversy—the pathbreaking article by Solow and Joseph Stiglitz (1968) that marked the beginning
of a long period when MIT was associated with various forms of ‘disequilibrium’ macroeconomics and
the ‘new Keynesian’ macroeconomics” (RB, p. 254). See Backhouse and Boianovsky (2013) for a full
account. It is noteworthy that Solow and Stiglitz, in order to explain short run unemployment, rely on
real wage rigidity in a one-sector model with given speeds of adjustment for the money wage and the
price of homogeneous output. Typically, Cambridge short run models rely on structural differences
between a consumption goods sector and an investment goods sector, as in Harcourt (1965), originally
presented to The Sraffa-Marris research student seminar, at which Solow was present (along with James
Meade, Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson, Piero Sraffa, Robin Marris, Luigi Pasinetti, and other well-known
research students, except for Nicky Kaldor, who was in Australia).
4
Robinson is mentioned just once by Samuelson when he refers to “…a general blue-print technology
model of Joan Robinson and M.I.T. type…” acknowledging the use by Robinson of models with a discrete
number of techniques, as in linear programming. Certainly, many had found it difficult to follow her
critique, which unearthed a “curious possibility … pointed out to me by Ruth Cohen” (Robinson, 195354, p. 106; see also Robinson, 1956, pp. 411-18). In particular, Backhouse notes that Solow had found it
“impenetrable”, citing a letter to Harry Johnson who, in his reply, remarks that the pre-publication draft
of Robinson’s article showed “signs of mental breakdown” which he hoped would be eliminated in the
final version (RB, p. 255, n. 7). Without elaborating on Johnson’s “long explanation” of the issues,
Backhouse concludes: “This exchange shows the importance of Johnson, not usually associated with this
controversy, as a liaison between two different ways of thinking” (ibid, p 256). In his published review of
a critical assessment by Blaug (1974), Johnson writes of the “usually arid and arcane technical literature
on the reswitching controversy” (Johnson, 1975, p. 1083). He praises Blaug for treating “with
2
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which others had analyzed in great detail; namely, the two theoretical anomalies: doubleswitching or reswitching of techniques, and reverse capital deepening.5
It is difficult to square Samuelson’s evident desire to nail down exactly what he saw as his own
error6 with the broad claim that, for the MIT economists, the whole controversy had been a
waste of time. No doubt, what Backhouse has in mind is the fact that the MIT economists
found no reason to doubt the correctness of their analysis of “Efficient Programs of Capital
Accumulation”, the title of the second of two key chapters of the famous text, Linear
Programming and Economic Analysis (Dorfman, Samuelson, and Solow, 1958; hereafter,
DOSSO), which was at the time a work in progress. As for ending the controversy, Backhouse
credits Christopher Bliss (1975) with “the definitive summary of the issues in the controversy, at
least from the neoclassical side”.7 Bliss acknowledges (ibid, p. xxx) that the neoclassical theory
of capital accumulation has no clear, or even intended, connection with economic reality.
Less than half the text of Robinson (1953-54) was reprinted in the second volume of her
Collected Economic Papers, together with a “Postscript” (Robinson, 1960, pp. 114-31). This
sustains the observation that her analysis of choice of technique was “mixed in with arguments
related to her generalization of John Maynard Keynes’s General Theory about the impossibility
of an economy with a falling rate of interest to adjust smoothly to capital accumulation” (RB, p.
256). It is remarkable how easily Robinson extracted what she later called this “negative part”
(Robinson, 1960, p. 130), adding but a single connecting paragraph to link abbreviated sections
of the original. The “constructive parts are better done in my book” (ibid), referring to The
Accumulation of Capital (Robinson, 1956). Her new results, developed with that aid of
diagrams, were later brought to prominence in Harcourt (1969, 1972), “the classical account of

exceptional academic restraint what can only be described as a boisterous display of shoddy pseudoscholarship in the history of economic thought that substitutes for a blinkered poverty of economic
imagination” (ibid, pp. 1083-84). A liaison would not usually indulge in such intemperate language. In
any case, Johnson appears ambivalent. He regarded Sraffa’s Production of Commodities by Means of
Commodities as the most exasperating book to come out of Cambridge “since its emergence as a centre
of economic theory” (Johnson, 1962, p. 464) and yet describes its analysis as “extremely elegant and
rigorous” (ibid, p. 465).
5
In later work with Naqvi, Robinson argued that reverse capital deepening was the more fundamental
result: “Thus double switching is associated with perversity. The interesting point, however, is the
perversity, not the duplicity” (Robinson and Naqvi, 1967, p. 580), a memorable “Joan-ism” of the type
Johnson had apparently found objectionable (RB, p. 255).
6
“The reversal of direction of the (i, NNP) relation was, I must confess, the single most surprising
revelation from the reswitching discussion… I had wrongly confused concavity of [the productionpossibility frontier] with concavity of the (i, NNP) steady-state locus” (Samuelson, 1966, p. 577, n. 6).
7
Burmeister (1980), more closely connected to MIT, could be similarly described.
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this debate” (RB, p. 253).8 As for the “negative” part, Robinson had reworked it completely in
“Accumulation and the Production Function” (Robinson, 1959) to show “how the neoclassical
production function can be rescued if we bring the Keynesian conditions to its aid” (Robinson,
1960, p. 131).9
Backhouse further justifies his “waste of time” assessment of the capital controversy by
claiming that Robinson “refused to regard [capital accumulation] as a dynamic problem,
insisting on expressing it in terms of comparative statics” (RB, p. 256). This goes hand in hand
with an acceptance of intertemporal equilibrium analysis as the only basis upon which to erect
a rigorous analysis of capital accumulation under condition of competition, rejecting Robinson’s
analysis of various “ages” (golden, leaden, platinum, galloping platinum, etc.), her first steps
towards a realistic analysis of accumulation under capitalist conditions. Unlike the straightjacket of intertemporal equilibrium models, her models were intentionally open-ended or
underdetermined from a formal point of view (cf. Harris, 2005).
Denying the comparison of steady states much, if any, theoretical relevance is the position
taken by Bliss (1975) and Burmeister (1980).10 The same is true of DOSSO, frequently cited by
Backhouse, where output is always at a point on an economy’s short run production-possibility
frontier. It is therefore worth looking carefully at chapters 11 and 12 of that justly famous work
8

For further analyses of capital theoretic anomalies, see Hicks (1965), Spaventa (1968), Garegnani
(1970), Harris (1973), Gram (1976), and especially Salvadori (1996) where the mathematics of
Robinson’s “productivity curves” is thoroughly developed and where the various results in the literature
are linked back Harcourt’s survey (Salvadori, 1996, pp. 243-44; and p. 245, n. 1 for the history of
Salvadori’s work on productivity curves). Concerning Harcourt (1972), Johnson is again ambivalent,
seeming to praise the book as a “Cambridge explanation, justification, and vindication” (Johnson, 1975,
p. 1083) while applauding Blaug’s assessment of the controversy as “properly scathing about the
‘essentialism’ of Harcourt and Company” (ibid).
9
It is worth noting that in both The Accumulation of Capital (Robinson, 1956) and its sequel (Robinson,
1962) there is a noticeable shift toward the analysis of cyclical growth along the lines of Goodwin (1967)
and Kalecki (1968). See the Introduction by GCH and Prue Kerr to the Palgrave Classics Edition of The
Accumulation of Capital, pp. xix-xxv; and Harcourt, 2015, p. 251.
10
It is important to point out that those who consider Sraffa (1960) as having set the stage of a revival of
the standpoint of the old Classical economists reject the claim that a uniform rate of profit on the value
of reproducible capital goods can only occur in a thorough-going steady state. For them, the method of
long-period analysis, which enforces a uniform rate of profits under conditions of competition, was
common to both classical and neoclassical economics prior to ascendancy of intertemporal equilibrium
analysis, and is entirely independent of any assumption concerning the composition of output, much less
that the economy is in a steady state equilibrium. Garegnani (1976) argued that Hicks was responsible
for a change in the notion of equilibrium which ushered in this ascendancy. Notably, there is only one
mention of Hicks in the two chapters on intertemporal equilibrium analysis found in DOSSO. It arises in
connection with models of the business cycle, and there is no suggestion that the work of Hicks is
foundational to intertemporal equilibrium analysis. For MIT, that credit goes, first and foremost, to
Frank Ramsey (1928), as is made clear in Samuelson and Solow (1956).
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in order to come to a fair judgment of Robinson’s most long standing complaint about modern
neoclassical economics, namely, the absence “of any plausible account of a mechanism to keep
the economy in equilibrium” (Robinson, 1960, p. 131).
On reading these chapters, one is struck by the fact that the authors’ main target is Leontief.
They repeatedly take exception to his assumption, in dynamic models, that all stocks of capital
goods are fully utilized at all points in time. This is shown to be inconsistent with efficiency,
apart from special cases. The criticism itself is understandable in view of an essential purpose
of the book, which is to show the importance of recognizing that efficiency in production does
not necessarily imply that every resource is fully utilized. Leontief’s assumption that stocks are
fully utilized fixes the composition of output at each moment (in a fixed coefficients model),
sacrificing the flexibility associated with allowing at least some stock(s) to remain under-utilized
in a given period. This can place the economy inside its potential production-possibility frontier
in the next period, thereby reducing potential consumption.
Complementing its formalism, there is a fascinating—and somewhat puzzling—half-page of
interpretation in DOSSO at the end of a section entitled Competitive Markets and Dynamic
Efficiency. The authors note first of all that, starting from any point measuring initial stocks net
of consumption (consumable stocks allow for a clear two-dimensional diagram), there are many
efficient paths forward such that the economy remains always at a point on its expanding
production-possibilities frontier. Invoking Adam Smith, they write:
The truly remarkable thing about the intertemporal invisible hand is that while it results
in efficiency over long periods of time, it requires only the most myopic vision on the
part of market participants. Just current prices and [their] current rates of change need
to be known, and at each moment long-run efficiency is preserved (DOSSO, p. 321).
There then follows an equally remarkable sentence concerning the role of the future:
But for society as a whole there is need for vision at a distance (ibid).

5

Although the authors illustrate the nature of such vision by specifying final stock prices, they
include a footnote stating that initial stock prices will do, setting the system off in just the right
direction11 to ensure convergence to a pre-specified future point.12
Students of dynamic optimization theory are familiar with the requirement for “vision at a
distance” as embodied in one of more transversality conditions (among the first-order
conditions for a maximal path using the methods of optimal control theory).13 It is these
conditions that are shown in modern textbooks to underlie the ubiquitous saddle-path property
of capital stocks and their prices (DOSSO, Fig. 12-9, p. 334). A key property of the convergent
branch of a saddle-path is its inherent instability—on either side, prices and/or quantities
follow an unsustainable trajectory. How to get on to the convergent path is the question that
Joan Robinson would have insisted on being answered. She may not have known the
mathematics, but she knew what the problem was—a testimony to her deep understanding of
equilibrium theory. As for what happens whenever the underlying parameters of an
intertemporal equilibrium model change, somehow asset prices must simply jump onto a new
convergent saddle path, an adjustment problem that is rarely, if ever discussed.14

11

The formal theory is the same as that found in Pontryagin et al (1962), one use of which is to
determine the angle of take-off of a space-craft intended to land on or fly by a distant object whose
future position can be calculated. Getting the take-off trajectory exactly right can be crucial as “tiny
errors can grow calamitous” (Chang, 2015. p. A1). The same is true of initial asset prices in
intertemporal equilibrium models of capital accumulation.
12
In view of the concern of the critics of mainstream theory with the assumption that capital is a given
quantity of value, it is of further interest to quote part of the final paragraph of this interpretive section:
One interesting sidelight before we leave the subject of intertemporal pricing: Consider any
efficient capital program and its corresponding profile of prices and own-rates [rates of change
of prices]. At every point of time the value of the capital stock at current efficiency prices,
discounted back to the initial time, is a constant, equal to the initial value. This law of
conservation of discounted value of capital (or discounted Net National Product) reflects, as do
the grand laws of conservation of energy in physics, the maximizing nature of the path (DOSSO,
pp. 321-22, emphasis in the original).
Such constancy means that the components of the vector of prices, 𝑝, and the vector of quantities, 𝑘, in
the inner product 𝑝′𝑘 measuring the value of capital are continuously undergoing offsetting changes.
13
Although there is no reference to transversality conditions in DOSSO, the authors are fully aware of
their importance. In a paper that “generalizes the Ramsey model to any number of capital goods”,
Samuelson and Solow write: “The resulting mathematical problem turns out to have some intrinsically
intricate transversality or end conditions that will probably be of importance in many dynamic
programming problems” (Samuelson and Solow, 1956, p. 537). Prescient words, indeed!
14
Some have made a virtue out of necessity. A proponent of the rational expectations hypothesis
(which adds well-behaved randomness to the deterministic structure of intertemporal equilibrium
models) writes that the ridge-like nature of a saddle-path, “far from being an unlikely freak case,
provides the only sensible basis for forward looking expectations when individuals are well informed
about the structure of the economy” (Begg, 1982, p. 40). Recent work signals the demise of such claims.
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Citing letters, Backhouse observes that “when their debate with Robinson continued in
correspondence, Samuelson claimed that his work with Solow showed how any number of
heterogeneous capital goods could be handled, sending Kahn (more likely to understand it than
Robinson) a copy of Linear Programming and Economic Analysis” (RB, p. 258).15 Although no
evidence is cited to suggest that Robinson ever discussed the book with Kahn, she did write of
intertemporal general equilibrium: “I have never been able to make that theory stand up long
enough to knock it down” (Robinson, 1980, p. 128). In view of the knife edge property of
convergent saddle-paths, this is an entirely apt description.
Where, then, does this leave the Robinson-Samuelson debate? Obviously, Samuelson fully
understood the saddle-path property of solutions to dynamic optimization problems.
Moreover, he continued to study the connection between equilibrium models of accumulation
and the physical laws of energy conservation (Samuelson, 1990). As for their relevance to the
analysis of accumulation in an actual economy—DOSSO is full of asides concerning the
possibility of operationalizing the theory—perhaps the clearest expression of simultaneous
doubt and faith is found in Samuelson (1967).16 He heads up a concluding section describing his
faith in the ability of a market economy to right itself, re-aiming prices and quantities along a
saddle-path of accumulation (analyzed in the preceding sections) in just such a way as to satisfy
all the conditions of intertemporal equilibrium.17 Samuelson uses the image of a cyclist, which
again is most apt as it requires maintaining a balance while moving forward:
The image in my mind is that of a bicycle. The rider of the bicycle is the bulk of the
market, a somewhat mystical concept to be sure—like its analogue, the well-informed
speculator who gets his way in the end because his way is the correctly discerned way of

“The flavour of [our] results is that coordination of expectations of long-lived agents is necessarily weak.
There is no collective view of the future … that is able to trigger coordination … a “crisis,” here an
expectational crisis, is unavoidable … and the real-time falsification of beliefs in the long run, indicates
that … real-time learning must play a significant role” (Evans, Guesnerie, and McGough, 2014, p. 3).
15
Robinson once showed me a letter from Samuelson, written in the early 1970s, in which he referred
her to the chapters on efficient capital accumulation in DOSSO. When I suggested that society’s “vision
at a distance” was tantamount to perfect foresight, she shot back, “That is exactly my point!” She was
bewildered that brilliant minds were content to build an economic theory on such an illogical
foundation, notwithstanding its formal correctness and usefulness in other contexts.
16
This paper is in a collection containing one by Michael Bruno, possibly referred to by Samuelson in “A
Summing Up” (Samuelson, 1966, p. 582, n. 6). Bruno takes up the reswitching phenomena within the
framework of intertemporal general equilibrium theory, only to point out that, along an equilibrium
path, the economy will jump past those sections of the wage-profit frontier that might otherwise exhibit
reswitching (Bruno, 1967, p. 215). Along such paths, prices and growth rates may have to jump
discretely, but this is foreseen and so not an opportunity for arbitrage profits to be earned.
17
It seems that faith also informs an earlier and similar claim about asset prices: “This re-aiming is, so to
speak, what an optimizing society is constantly doing” (Samuelson and Solow, 1956, p. 548).
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the future; and those who think differently are bankrupted by their bets against (him
and) the future. (It is easier to identify the well-informed speculator ex post than ex
ante, and the image can easily dissolve into an empty tautology.) … Even if there is
something valid in this heuristic reasoning, one must admit that the system need not—
and, generally will not—move from its present position to the golden age in the most
efficient way: it will hare after false goals, get detoured, and begin to be corrected only
after it has erred. (Samuelson, 1967, pp. 229-30)
Elsewhere in his debates with Robinson, he refers to the role of “perspicacious planners, or
avaricious speculators in forward markets” (Samuelson, 1975, p. 45, n. 7) while granting that:18
…a skeptic may legitimately doubt that…a competitive market system will have the
‘foresight’ or the perfect-futures markets to approximate in real life such warranted
paths that have the property that, if everyone knew in advance they would occur, each
will be motivated to do just that which gives to them. (Samuelson, 1975, p. 45)
Returning to the metaphor of the bicycle, one of us once asked, echoing Robinson’s view of the
present as a sharp break between an irrevocable past and an unknowable future:
Is the cyclist’s sense of balance sufficient justification for using a magic wand, called the
transversality condition, to pick out a convergent saddle-path? This sleight of hand
erases the troublesome effects of past decisions made under different circumstances
and sets the economy on a new convergent path where events unfold as expected. For
Robinson, this methodology is unacceptable. It ignores the dead hand of history and
regards the future as knowable. (Gram, 2005, p. 121)
Conclusion
Without looking more carefully at the arguments contained in the main work of the MIT
economists that he cites, Backhouse fails to give full recognition to Joan Robinson’s intuitive
understanding of the Achilles’ heel of intertemporal equilibrium models of capital
accumulation. The real mystery is why the MIT economists failed to acknowledge more often
and more clearly that their theory imposed the condition of perfect foresight which was such
anathema to Robinson.19 She thought that their theory could be undermined by its apparent
need for “leets”, a magical type of capital (“steel” spelled backwards) that can somehow change
18

The hypothetical skeptic in this passage is, no doubt, Harcourt: “To conclude the reply to Professor
Harcourt’s query, the vast literature on the ‘Hahn problem’ should be consulted to form a reasonable
opinion on how tolerably inefficient or efficient are market and planned systems in the real world…”
Samuelson (1975, p. 45). The “Hahn problem”, a reference to Hahn (1966), concerns precisely the
unstable nature of a convergent saddle-path somehow thought to be picked out by “optimizing society”.
19
See also Gram (2010, p. 362).
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form whenever needed to accommodate a change of technique.20 As for perfect foresight—the
absurdity Robinson knew would have pernicious consequences for economic theory and
policy—it is notable that Backhouse, in quoting Solow’s reply to Robinson (1953-54), omits a
final crucial part of what he wrote:
…dispensing with the notion of the “quantity of capital” will make the theory…harder.
But the real difficulty…comes not from the physical diversity of capital goods. It comes
from the intertwining of past, present and future, from the fact that while there is
something foolish about a theory of capital built on the assumption of perfect foresight,
we have no equally precise and definite assumption to take its place (Solow, 1955-56, p.
102, emphasis added).
The great question which has always haunted the type of analysis offered by the MIT
economists in answer to Robinson’s provocative critique has always been her own question:
how to get into equilibrium? If “vision at a distance” (DOSSO, p. 321) means co-ordination of
long-term expectations, recent work shows, within the context of dynamic general equilibrium
theory, that “getting into equilibrium” is an impossibility.21 This vindicates Robinson’s position
in the capital controversy, at least with respect to the MIT economists.22 Their effort to
formalize the process of accumulation as an equilibrium path using the methods of dynamic
optimization may finally be seen as the real “waste of time” to which Backhouse might have
drawn his reader’s attention. A student seeking inoculation might therefore do well to go back
to “A Lecture Delivered at Oxford by a Cambridge Economist” (Robinson, 1953)—a favorite of
ours—in which she “sets out her views on the nature of equilibrium, of how in her opinion you
cannot get into it, or even tend toward it … [together with a] discussion of the nature of time …
more fresh and exciting (and insightful even)” (Harcourt, 1996, p. 324) than is to be found in her
later work.

20

The consummate neoclassical price theorist, George Stigler, did argue that any reasonable notion of
the marginal product of labor requires the assumption that capital is a given value, transmutable in form
(Stigler, 1987, p. 136). In earlier editions of his once widely used text, Stigler (1952, p. 117) cited Dennis
Robertson (1931) who wondered how ten shovels might be transmuted into eleven, less durable ones of
equal value when defining the marginal product of an eleventh man joining ten digging a ditch—or
should he just be sent to fetch a bucket of beer? See Gram (2013, p. 39-40) and Harcourt (2015, p. 244).
21
See the impossibility theorem in Evans, Guesnerie and McGough (2014).
22
Of course, it says nothing about her differences with those who find in Sraffa (1960) the basis for an
entirely different set of arguments and possibilities for fruitful analysis.
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